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challenge. This article discusses United States and international legal developments and relates
educational inclusion to controversies within the disability studies movement. It considers
questions that have been raised about integrated education and concludes that inclusion should
remain the goal, but that more attention must be devoted to making educational inclusion work.
Key Words: special education, disability studies, inclusion
*Editor’s Note: This article was anonymously peer reviewed.
Historically, children with disabilities have been excluded from education and, when
allowed into school, kept in separate settings where the expectations are low and the quality of
services lower. Political action culminating in statutory change corrected that condition, so that
in many societies children with disabilities now make their way through the schoolhouse door
and receive some basic level of educational services. But achieving the goal of full inclusion in
classes with nondisabled peers remains a challenge, and some writers have raised questions
about whether overcoming that challenge is a worthwhile enterprise. In this article, I discuss the
challenges and the questions, concluding that integration should remain the goal, but that more
attention should be devoted to the mechanisms that will make the goal a desirable one. The
article begins with a brief history of inclusion in American special education law, then takes up
some legal sources from outside the United States. It continues with a discussion of educational
inclusion in relation to ideas developed by the international disability studies movement. It
considers criticisms of the educational effectiveness of inclusive education, then discusses some
possible solutions for the problems raised concerning inclusive education.
A Brief History of Inclusion in United States Special Education Law
Laying the Foundations for Inclusion
Two court decisions from the 1970s form the foundation of federal special education law
in the United States. In PARC v. Pennsylvania (1972) and Mills v. Board of Education of the
District of Columbia (1972), the class action plaintiffs asserted that by failing to provide
educational services that met their needs, the defendants violated the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The PARC
class consisted of children with mental retardation who had been excluded from public school.
The court approved entry of a consent decree requiring, among other things, the placement of
each child with mental retardation “in a free, public program of education and training
appropriate to the child’s capacity” (p. 285). The decree provided that:
“. . . [P]lacement in a regular public school class is preferable to placement in a
special public school class and placement in a special public school class is

preferable to placement in any other type of program of education and training”
(p. 307).
The fundamental educational policy supporting mainstreamed placement to the greatest
extent possible reflected current best educational practices, but also had antecedents in judicial
activity in other contexts. The activists who brought the initial cases asserting a constitutional
right to education for children with disabilities had also worked on or were familiar with the
contemporaneous litigation concerning conditions in institutions for persons with intellectual
disabilities and mental illness. One of the most prominent claims the advocates asserted in those
cases was that persons with mental disabilities should not be separated from the outside world
unnecessarily. Courts ultimately recognized the principle that persons could not be involuntarily
civilly committed unless dangerous to themselves or others, with the Supreme Court declaring,
“[T]here is no constitutional basis for confining persons [with mental illness] involuntarily if
they are dangerous to no one and can live in freedom… Mere public intolerance or animosity
cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person’s physical liberty” (O’Connor v.
Donaldson, 1975, pp. 575-76). Over time, courts adopted the idea that among restrictive
settings, the least restrictive is to be preferred (Youngberg v. Romeo, 1982).
These ideas resonated in policy-making bodies other than courts. When federal
administrative agencies drafted regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
(which bars discrimination against persons with disabilities in federally assisted activities) (2006,
originally passed 1973) and title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (which bars
discrimination against persons with disabilities in state and local government services, programs
and activities) (2006, originally passed 1990), they included provisions forbidding separate
services to persons with disabilities unless necessary to provide services that are as effective as
those provided others (Section 504 Regulations, § 32.4(b)(1)(iv), 2006; ADA Regulations, §
35.130(b)(1)(iv), 2006). They also imposed the requirement that the state or local government
administer services in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified persons
with disabilities (Section 504 Regulations, § 32.4(d); ADA Regulations, § 35.130(d)). This latter
provision of the ADA regulations radiated its influence back to the Supreme Court by furnishing
the grounds for the holding in Olmstead v. L.C. (1999) that states must provide community based
treatment for persons with mental disabilities when such a placement is appropriate, the
individual does not oppose the placement, and the placement can reasonably be accommodated.
The litigants and judges in PARC and other special education cases also drew on the
history of the racial desegregation campaign in the United States. The challenge to Jim Crow
schooling went on for more than a generation before the Supreme Court recognized in Brown v.
Board of Education that “[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal” (1954, p. 495).
Mills, a case similar to PARC filed by a broad class of children with disabilities excluded from
the District of Columbia schools, quoted Brown at length, and relied as well on race
discrimination cases specific to the District of Columbia (pp. 874-75). The comparison is
obvious between the racial separation that existed between white and African American
schoolchildren and the diversion of children with disabilities into separate locations in which
expectations for their success diminish and opportunities for greater learning vanish. Distinctive
treatment of those with disabilities and those without confers the same sort of stigma associated
with separation of the races into inferior and dominant groups (Goffman, 1963, p. 4).
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, the federal law that followed
the PARC and Mills cases and required American states and school districts to provide all

children with disabilities a free, appropriate public education, established that to the maximum
extent appropriate, children with disabilities must be educated with children who are not
disabled. Special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children from the regular
educational environment is to occur only when the nature or severity of the disability is such that
education in regular classes cannot be achieved satisfactorily with the use of supplementary aids
and services (Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, now Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 2006, § 1412(a)(5)(A)). The preference for inclusive
placement was based on strong policy recommendations from professionals involved in the
education of children with disabilities (Sheffler, 1981). IDEA nevertheless permits, and has
always permitted, highly restrictive placements. In the earliest appellate and Supreme Court
decisions under the law, several cases required school districts to pay for placements in
residential schools or other children-with-disabilities-only settings that the parents contended
their children needed in order to learn (e.g., Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 1985).
Presumption in Favor of Integration
Judicial decisions from the early years of the federal special education law established
that the statutory provision and the regulations enacted to enforce it create a presumption in favor
of least restrictive, more integrated placements. Roncker v. Walter (1983) vacated and remanded
a lower court decision that placed a child with severe mental retardation in a county school that
had no children other than those with retardation. The appellate decision found that the lower
court had ignored the “strong congressional preference in favor of mainstreaming” (p. 1063).
The appellate court stressed: “The perception that a segregated institution is academically
superior for an handicapped child may reflect no more than a basic disagreement with the
mainstreaming concept” (p. 1063). The court recognized that the child had not made progress
when previously schooled in an integrated setting, but the crucial question was what services
would be provided there. The court said that in order to comply with the congressional mandate,
the lower court would have to “determine whether the services which make [a segregated]
placement superior could be feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting” (p. 1063). If they
can, the integrated placement must be provided.
Some other courts were less adamant in upholding the integration obligation. Daniel R.R.
v. State Board of Education (1989) affirmed a decision that kept a child with developmental
disabilities in a separate classroom, relying on school district claims that the child could not
satisfactorily be educated in a regular education setting. The court, nevertheless, treated
integration as the presumptive choice: “Congress preferred education in the regular educational
environment.” In applying that presumption, “First, we ask whether education in the regular
classroom, with the use of supplemental aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily for a
given child. . .If it cannot and the school intends to . . . remove the child from regular education,
we ask, second, whether the school has mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent
appropriate” (p. 1048). Other cases approving highly restrictive placements also nodded to the
integration presumption, although they ruled that integration was overcome by other
considerations under the specific circumstances present (e.g., DeVries v. Fairfax County Sch.
Bd., 1989).
In the 1990s, two prominent cases appeared that not only applied the presumption in
favor of integration in a rigorous way, but also took seriously the importance of delivering
services that would enable the child to succeed in the mainstream. In Sacramento Unified School

District v. Rachel H. (1994), the court upheld a lower court decision requiring a school district to
place a child with severe mental retardation in a second grade regular education classroom. The
court of appeals said that disputes over integration should be evaluated by considering (a) the
educational benefits of full-time placement in a regular education class, (b) the non-academic
benefits of integrated placement, (c) any effect of having the child with a disability in the
mainstream class on the teacher and other members of the class, and (d) extraordinary costs of
mainstreaming the child. The court relied on the lower court’s evidentiary findings that the child
was making progress on her individual educational goals, even though she was not learning the
same material as her classmates, and that she gained non-academic benefits in terms of selfconfidence as well as social and communication skills. The presence of an aide solved any
problems with potential absorption of disproportionate time from the teacher’s other activities,
and the cost was not insurmountable.
Oberti v. Board of Education (1993) involved an eight-year-old child with Down’s
Syndrome; the school district wanted to exclude him from a regular classroom and place him in a
special education class. The court of appeals affirmed a lower court decision in favor of the
child’s parents, who contended that the child could be educated in his regular education
classroom if he were provided adequate support services. In the mainstream class, the child had
displayed behavior problems including tantrums and aggression towards classmates. The
behavior gradually abated after placement in a self-contained class for children with multiple
disabilities. Experts testified that if the child received special support such as a behavior
modification plan and instructional modifications, he could learn in a regular education class,
and that the experience would assist him in working and communicating with children who were
not disabled. The modifications to the curriculum would include parallel instruction, where the
child would work separately within the classroom on activity similar to, but at a lower level than,
the work of his classmates; some separate resource room instruction would also be provided.
Speech and language therapy could be provided most effectively within the regular class
environment.
The court identified an “apparent tension within the Act between the strong preference
for mainstreaming . . . and the requirement that schools provide individualized programs tailored
to the specific needs of each disabled child,” but said that the tension could be resolved by the
school’s provision of supplemental aids and services to enable the child to be educated for a
majority of the time in a regular classroom while still addressing unique educational needs (p.
1214). Adopting the multi-factor test from Daniel R.R., the court found the efforts of the school
to accommodate the child in the mainstream to have been insufficient. It further found that the
benefits of placement in a regular education classroom were great, if the curriculum were
properly adapted, and it concluded that adequate supportive services would minimize the
likelihood of a significantly disruptive effect on the classroom.
Supplementary Services
Not all cases have taken the inclusion requirement as seriously as Rachel H. or Oberti,
particularly in the insistence on schools’ making mainstreaming work by adding supplementary
services. Cases continue to appear in which the courts find the presumption in favor of
integrated settings overcome by considerations of educational appropriateness, despite arguments
that the goals are not incompatible if adequate supported services are provided (e.g., Beth B. v.
Van Clay, 2002; Sch. Dist. v. Z.S. 2002).

Nevertheless, as Rachel H. and Oberti indicate, much of the debate over the application
of the least restrictive setting mandate in the United States has shifted from a for-it or against-it
clash to a discussion of what must be done to make it work. Cases thus tend to turn on the
question of which related services the school needs to supply, at what level of intensity.
Accordingly, one may conclude that the statutory language requiring “that removal from the
regular educational environment occurs only when . . . education in regular classes with the use
of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily” is not just a prohibition on
unnecessary separate schooling but a positive entitlement to the supplementary aids and services
needed to make mainstream education work (Weber, 2001).
The role of trained, committed teachers and aides delivering specialized services has
emerged as a major issue. In a recent case, a federal court of appeals found that a child’s
segregated educational program was inconsistent with the law because the school had developed
it without the participation of a general education teacher who could provide insights into how to
adapt general education to meet the child’s needs (M.L. v. Fed. Way Sch. Dist., 2005). Another
court of appeals rejected a school district’s proposal for a less integrated placement for a young
child with autism when the child was succeeding in a private general-education preschool chosen
by her parents, in which she had the assistance of an aide and an intensive applied behavioral
analysis program delivered primarily at home (L.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 2004).
Discipline
The courts have recognized that what makes inclusion work is not just personnel and
specialized instruction, but also modification of policies. In particular, if children are to learn in
the mainstream setting without facing constant suspension or other penalties for conduct related
to their disabilities, schools have to modify their disciplinary policies. Early cases permit
children’s exclusion from ordinary school settings for behavior that is alarming to the intolerant,
but of itself no impediment to anyone’s learning, such as uncontrollable drooling and facial
contortions (e.g., Beattie v. Board of Education, 1919). The Mills case illustrated the effect of
these practices in 1972: One of the named plaintiffs, a child with a brain injury, was excluded
from school because he wandered around the classroom. Two other plaintiffs, whose disabilities
were not specified, missed several years of schooling after exclusion from third or fourth grade
for having “behavior problem[s]” (p. 878). The court issued a decree forbidding the school
system from suspending a child from the schools for disciplinary reasons for any period in
excess of two days without affording a hearing and without providing for the child’s education
during the period of the suspension.
Disciplinary decisions continue to be a source of exclusion from mainstream educational
settings, although current law affirms the obligation not to discipline for behavior related to the
child’s disability, affords procedural protections, and forbids total cessation of services (IDEA, §
1415(k)). The most recent amendments to the special education law permit exclusion of children
from their ordinary placements if they possess weapons or drugs in school or inflict great bodily
injury, even if the behavior is related to their disability, but the exclusion is time-limited and
other misbehavior related to disability is to be treated as a basis for improved services, not longterm exclusion.
Policies other than disciplinary ones may also present obstacles to realizing the
simultaneous goals of effective learning and integration. The L.B. case cited above in connection
with personnel and curricular issues is of particular significance because it overturns the tyranny

of the six-to-seven hour school day and forces the school system to provide a program that takes
place largely after school hours, so the child may attend integrated classes when school is in
session. Some American courts have enforced the law to promote integration by requiring
changes in teacher certification processes to eliminate inflexible instructional groupings and
facilitate more inclusive classes (e.g., Corey H. v. Bd. of Educ., 1998; see also Reid L. v. Ill.
State Bd. of Educ., 2002).
An additional step to facilitate educational success in mainstreamed education is
aggressive action by schools to prevent harassment of children with disabilities and to stop it
when it occurs. Courts have upheld claims for damages relief against schools and individuals
under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the common law duty not to inflict emotional
distress when teachers have responded to the placement of children with disabilities in
mainstream settings by harassing the children or encouraging their peers to do so (e.g., Baird v.
Rose, 1999). Nevertheless, there are numerous obstacles to suits of this type, and an increase in
enforcement activity would facilitate inclusive education (Weber, 2002). As long as 25 years
ago, a court affirmed that the likelihood of encountering hostile attitudes is not a justification for
separate schooling, but rather a basis for ordering enhanced support for the child (Campbell v.
Talladega County Board of Education, 1981).
IDEA Amendments
The most recent amendment to the federal special education law, called the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, has potential to promote integration of
children with disabilities in general education. The new law allows up to 15% of federal special
education money to be used for early intervening services for children who have not formally
been found to have a disability (IDEA, § 1413(f)). This innovation blurs the distinction between
children designated as children with disabilities and other children, and accordingly may
diminish the stigma that currently follows from labels of specific disabling conditions (Garda,
2004, p. 443). The new law also enhances coordination with the No Child Left Behind initiative,
which establishes that a school may become in need of improvement or corrective action if any
of various subgroups of its students, including students with disabilities, fails to make adequate
progress towards meeting state grade-level achievement standards (Strengthening and
Improvement of Elementary and Secondary Schools Act, § 6311(b)(2)(C)(v)(II)(cc)). The
amended special education law provides that students with disabilities must be fully included in
district-wide achievement measures, and that the assessments will count in determining the need
for improvement or corrective action. These innovations may encourage school administrators
to take the same responsibility for special education students that they take for students in
general education, and to devote resources to bringing the achievement of special education
students up to grade level. The focus on achievement may be expected to facilitate students’
integration in mainstream education, as administrators realize that the overwhelming number of
students with disabilities can succeed in mainstream instruction at grade level if provided
adequate accommodations and supplemental services.
Some Approaches from Outside the United States
Canada

In Canada, the Supreme Court’s decision in Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education
(1997) denied the request of parents to keep their child in an integrated school setting. The child,
a 12-year-old with cerebral palsy, lacked the ability to communicate through speech or sign
language; she also had mobility limits. The Ontario Special Education Tribunal ruled that the
child should be educated in a segregated special education classroom, and the Supreme Court
found no violation of the equality rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedom. The Supreme Court applied a best-interests-of-the-child standard. Justice Sopinka
stated: “In some cases special education is a necessary adaptation of the mainstream world which
enables some disabled pupils access to the learning environment they need in order to have an
equal opportunity in education” (par. 69). The decision refused to adopt a presumption in favor
of integrated schooling, though it acknowledged that “integration should be recognized as the
norm of general application because of the benefits it provides…” (p. 69).
The Eaton decision appears incomplete because it does not discuss in any detail the role
of specialized services in making mainstream education work. Separate placements may well be
superior to integrated settings when there are no curricular modifications or support services in
the integrated placement. But if a best-interests standard is to be applied meaningfully, the
options should be supplemented to include something other than either inclusion with no
modifications or completely separate education. Approaches taken in other industrialized
societies may not be any more hospitable to inclusion than that found in the Eaton decision.
Theresia Degener and Gerard Quinn (2002, part 1.C.3.a.(ii)) describe a 1996 decision by the
German Federal Constitutional Court rejecting the claim of a girl using a wheelchair for mobility
for access to a regular school. The court ruled that the exclusion did not violate constitutional
anti-discrimination provisions.
The United Nations
International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
The United Nations General Assembly just passed the International Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral
International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons
with Disabilities, 2007). Article 24 deals with education. The text declares that the States
Parties recognize the right of all persons with disabilities to education, and that States Parties
shall ensure an inclusive education system directed to the development of the child’s personality,
talents, and creativity, as well as the child’s mental and physical abilities, to their fullest
potential. With specific regard to inclusion, the text provides that States Parties must ensure that
“Persons with disabilities are not excluded from the general education system on the basis of
disability, and that children with disabilities are not excluded from free and compulsory primary
education, or from secondary education, on the basis of disability” (Art. 24, § 2(a)), also that
“Persons with disabilities can access an inclusive, quality, and free primary education and
secondary education on an equal basis with others in the communities in which they live” (§
2(b)). The text further requires States Parties to give persons with disabilities “the support
required, within the general education system, to facilitate their effective education.”
There were alternate texts that were considered, including one that stated, “In those
circumstances where the general education system cannot adequately meet the individual support
needs of persons with disabilities, States Parties shall ensure that effective individualized support

measures are provided in environments which maximise academic and social development,
consistent with the goal of full inclusion” (§ 2(d)).
The language chosen by the drafters of the convention suggests a decision not to accept
any possibility that the general education system may fail to meet the needs of all children. The
commitment is to provide inclusive education, and to provide supports to make inclusive
education meet children’s needs. The draft, however, also does not take a clear position on
whether parents can choose programs for their children that are less inclusive than general
education. The text forbids exclusion from general education and requires access to inclusive
education, but it does not appear to bar States Parties from offering less inclusive options.
Additional provisions call for facilitating the learning of Braille, sign language and other
alternate forms of communication, as well as peer support and mentoring. The text requires “the
promotion of the linguistic identity of the deaf community” and insists “that the education of
persons, and in particular children, who are blind, deaf and deafblind, is delivered in the most
appropriate languages and modes and means of communication for the individual, and in
environments which maximize academic and social development” (§ 3(a)-(c)).
On topics other than education, the convention draft adopts an approach strongly in favor
of inclusion and against separation. Article 3 states that the fundamental principles of the
convention embrace, “Full and effective participation and inclusion in society” (§ (c)).
Discrimination is defined as exclusion and restriction of rights and freedoms, as well as failure to
provide reasonable accommodation (Art. 2, par. 3). The draft affirms the right to live
independently and be fully included in the community (Art. 19).
If the convention reaches widespread adoption, retains its current form, and is made
enforceable, its effects on education will be quite uncertain. In Eaton and many United States
and other countries’ special education cases in which school systems insisting on separate
schooling prevail, the parents wanted general education for their children, and demanded
appropriate program modifications and extra services. If the convention were interpreted to
require States Parties to honor parents’ choices, the cases would be decided differently. But
apart from imposing an obligation to provide support, the convention does not specify what
school systems need to do in terms of enhanced services for children with disabilities in
mainstream settings. If the specialized services that children need in order to succeed in
inclusive placements are not available, parents may effectively be denied access to integrated
schooling for their children. Similarly, if disciplinary policies are not modified and harassment
stopped, parents’ adaptive preferences are likely to be for separation. If the convention is
interpreted in line with cases such as Rachel H. and Oberti, however, requiring schools to depart
from standard operating procedure and greatly expand services and make policy modifications
for children with disabilities in general education, the parents could make the choice for
inclusive education. The requirement of “environments which maximize academic and social
development” for children who are deaf, blind, and deaf-blind in section 3 of the education
article may imply the possibility of separate educational settings for children with those
disabilities. The desirability of those options is a subject of ongoing discussions in the disability
rights movement generally.
The Salamanca Statement
The draft Convention builds on previous international efforts to shift policy towards
inclusive education for children with disabilities. In 1994, representatives of 92 governments

and 25 nongovernmental organizations adopted the Salamanca Statement on Principles, Policy
and Practice in Special Needs Education. The Statement declares that “those with special
educational needs must have access to regular schools which should accommodate them with a
child-centered pedagogy capable of meeting these needs” (p. vii). The statement thus recognizes
both the importance of inclusion and the need for accommodations to make it successful. The
statement also contains exceptions and limits, however. Governments are urged to adopt “the
principle of inclusive education, enrolling all children in regular schools, unless there are
compelling reasons for doing otherwise” (p. ix). Specifically, assignment to separate schools or
special classes or sections within a school on a permanent basis is to take place “only in those
infrequent cases where it is clearly demonstrated that education in regular classrooms is
incapable of meeting a child’s educational or social needs or when it is required for the welfare
of the child or that of other children” (p. 12). In comparison to the draft convention, the
statement gives more leeway for governments to deny inclusion on the basis of claimed
educational goals.
With respect to separate education of children who are deaf or deaf-blind, the statement
continues:
“The importance of sign language as the medium of communication among the
deaf, for example, should be recognized and provision made to ensure that all
deaf persons have access to education in their national sign language. Owing to
the particular communication needs of deaf and deaf/blind persons, their
education may be more suitably provided in special schools or special classes and
units in mainstream schools” (p. 18).
This approach reflects ambivalence about separate schooling for persons who are
deaf.
Integrated Education and the Disability Studies Movement
The early years of what became the disability studies movement were marked by
attention to the social constructs that exclude persons with disabilities from mainstream society.
The effort was integrationist and inclusionary (tenBroek & Matson, 1966). Timothy Cook
(1991) accurately described the achievement in the United States of the Americans with
Disabilities Act as the move to integration. The emphasis was on removing social, cultural,
political, and physical barriers that prevented people with disabilities from participating in
mainstream society. Leaders of the movement advanced various ideas: that the medicalizing of
disability and consequent imposition of legal, attitudinal, and physical constraints marginalize
persons with disabilities, effectively socially constructing disability (Linton, 1998, p. 35); that
persons with disabilities are members of a minority group whose political and civil rights the
majority refuses to recognize (tenBroek & Matson, 1966), and that economic and social
structures devalue and exclude persons who do not meet an able bodied ideal (Hahn, 1997).
Inclusion emerged as a priority for legal and social reform.
The commitment was not merely one of words. Inclusion lay at the heart of the goals of
political and social activity towards disability rights. The Center for Independent Living at
Berkeley promoted equal access to education, housing, and other social goods, and soon other
organizations adopted the same objective (Scotch, 2001, p. 36). The striking achievement of the

political efforts in the United States was the Americans with Disabilities Act and its mandate for
integration of persons with disabilities in the mainstream of society. The 1975 Education for All
Handicapped Children Act, with its qualified but resolute insistence on inclusive education, was
an earlier victory along the road to political reform.
More recently, a number of writers who are part of the disability studies movement have
advanced criticism of non-nuanced efforts simply to inject persons with disabilities into
previously exclusive settings. Assertion of the right to integration with persons without
disabilities still leaves the person with disabilities the different one, the other (Johnson, 2003, p.
65). Thus it may reinforce the dominant, non-disabled norm (Minow, 1990, pp. 19-48). In
education, laws prescribing inclusion without doing more exalt the prerogatives of special
education experts and may cast students with disabilities into settings in which they will be
token, low-ranking participants in social systems run by and for those who are not deemed to
have disabilities (Cook & Slee, 1999).
These insights are less a challenge to the inclusion ideal than a criticism of how inclusion
has frequently been realized in practice. If the non-disabled norm shifts because of integration of
people with disabilities, or if the norm can be made to disappear altogether (Davis, 2002, p. 117),
a truer inclusion occurs. Part of the problem is simply that of numbers. If larger numbers of
persons with disabilities integrate into previous segregated settings, people without disabilities
will display fewer reactions. Surprise wears thin over time. Another aspect of the problem is
economics. In societies that value wealth, the typically lower economic status of persons with
disabilities limits their integration on equal terms with persons who do not have disabling
conditions. Lower economic status traces back, in turn, to the failure of the workplace to provide
adaptations and the failure of social systems, particularly in the United States, to shoulder more
of the medical and other costs currently imposed on people who live with a disability (Weber,
2000). Some writers who remain adamant on the integration ideal stress that society needs
reforms directed towards placing larger numbers of persons with disabilities into the mainstream
of society and giving them more access to paying jobs, programs that cover extraordinary
medical costs, and occasions for social and economic interaction on a plane of equality with
others (Bagenstos, 2004).
With regard to inclusive education, the numbers and economics issues are not far from
the surface, but the pervasive issue is the nature of the educational experience into which
students with disabilities are integrated. Indeed, Professor Ruth Colker’s (2006) recent critique
of the integration presumption in American special education law stresses the failure of the
general education system to adapt to the needs of children with disabilities and to change the
prejudiced attitudes of mainstream teachers with respect to children with learning disabilities and
other conditions. As American courts have come to realize, correcting the negative attitudes of
teachers and the inflexible nature of conventional educational programming is necessary for
integration to be successful.
In addition to the critiques of unadorned integrationism stand other criticisms of inclusion
based on cultural integrity. One aspect of disability studies is to note, and to celebrate, disability
culture. Prominent is the shared set of cultural connections that has developed around the use of
sign language (Burch, 2002; Davidson, 2002). The recognition of that culture calls into question
conventional inclusion practices. Inclusion may be a rationale for eliminating separate
institutions that foster the use of sign. Ending those institutions challenges the continuity and
growth of a linguistic minority’s cultural tradition. Since these institutions typically constitute
part of the educational establishment of the nations they serve, policies of educational inclusion

may threaten the culture itself. In this way, dominant cultural institutions tend to drive out
minority cultures and the institutions that would preserve them (Cover,1983, p. 53).
Controversies About Educational Effectiveness
Numerous sources, some associated with the disability studies movement and some not,
also criticize integration on the basis of educational effectiveness and related concerns about
costs, disruption, and backlash. Ruth Colker (2006) argues that a presumption of a fully
inclusive educational setting is not justified for children with a variety of disabling conditions.
Colker compiles various sources of educational research, some of which demonstrate that
teachers in mainstream settings are ill-trained to instruct students with mental retardation, and
that mainstream classrooms have inadequate teacher-student ratios for the optimal education of
students whose mental retardation is severe. She describes other sources as showing that
mainstreamed students with learning disabilities make disappointing progress, although the
sources do not make any rigorous comparison to students with learning disabilities in separate
programs and some other sources cited indicate that gains in the two settings are comparable.
She also demonstrates that students and teachers frequently impose stigma on students with
disabilities, particularly those with learning disabilities and emotional or intellectual
impairments. As Colker notes, other outsiders also experience ostracism and negative
expectations when integrated with majority group members, notably African-American children
suddenly placed in majority white schools.
That inclusion may be done badly is no news to people with disabilities. Similarly,
anyone entering a social setting who is different is likely to be the target of stigma, particularly
when the difference is manifested by the apparent failure to conform to established standards of
learning or deportment (Goffman, 1963). Carefully designed interventions, such as joint work
on academic and special interest projects, are needed to accomplish peer acceptance of students
with learning disabilities in mainstream classrooms (Fox, 1989; see also Belkin, 2004). Not
surprisingly, students with disabilities and teachers often feel more comfortable in segregated
settings, particularly when the students are middle-school age or older (Gross, 2005). As noted
above, the issue in contested cases in the United States has shifted from inclusion per se to the
nature and quality of interventions. These interventions include teacher training, additional
personnel, curricular and policy modifications, and effective action to halt harassment. A central
insight of the disability studies movement is that attitudinal barriers are every bit as handicapping
as physical ones. The idea is that the attitudes, not the disabilities, need fixing. Although
clumsy inclusion initiatives will not improve attitudes (indeed, they will reinforce negative
impressions), segregating children with disabilities eliminates any chance of progress towards
that goal.
In the United States, the Report of the President’s Commission on Excellence in Special
Education (2002) stresses the importance of removing attitudinal barriers to the acceptance of
children with disabilities in general education settings. One of the key findings states:
“Children placed in special education are general education children
first….[C]hildren with disabilities are often treated, not as children who are
members of general education and whose special instructional needs can be met
with scientifically based approaches, they are considered separately with unique
costs—creating incentives for misidentification and academic isolation…” (p. 6).

The Commission’s prescriptions, such as adjusting financial incentives, encouraging early
intervention, and enhancing teacher training, appear unlikely to be adequate by themselves to
make inclusion work properly. Nevertheless, acceptance of the central insight that all children
are the responsibility of the general education system is logical as a first step in changing
prevailing attitudes. Changes in policies and programs would then proceed from the premise that
children with disabilities should achieve successful education in integrated settings.
Advocacy of integration is fueled in part by aspirations for a better future in the long run,
even though there may be difficulties with reaching that ideal state. In other contexts, the law
pursues integration even though lingering prejudice may result in hardship. In Palmore v. Sidoti
(1984), the United States Supreme Court ruled that it is improper for a court to consider the
social stigma that a child might feel remaining in the custody of a Caucasian mother who is
living with an African American man after divorce from the child’s father. Chief Justice Burger
declared: “Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect” (p. 433). The aspirational is never far from the descriptive. Even
Colker, who elsewhere criticizes proponents of the inclusion presumption for relying on “moral,
rather than empirical arguments” (p. 832) decides, apparently on a moral basis, not to consider
any detrimental impact of inclusion or noninclusion on children without disabilities, “Because all
children are entitled to an adequate and appropriate education in our society” (p. 793, note 12).
Some Possible Compromise Solutions
Is there room for compromise in the conflict between supporters and skeptics of
integration? One possible compromise solution that has received some support, particularly with
regard to matters of cultural preservation, is choice. Parents might be permitted to choose
separate schooling, provided that integrated alternatives remain available. This approach has its
attractions. Cultural institutions valued by persons with blindness or deafness can continue, but
no one will be forced into them by the lack of anywhere else to go. Ultimately, however, choice
presents its own problems. Few societies will be wealthy enough to provide intensive services in
both integrated and separate settings. Parents will be forced to make choices based on adaptive
preferences. Moreover, if too few parents choose the separate options, the institutions will
wither. The choice option is most realistic at the post-secondary level, where students are likely
to be making their own decisions after exposure to the mainstream, and where relocation to a
setting away from home may be part of the cultural norm for all students.
Even if choice is not the solution to the problem of preserving institutions that further
disability culture, the nature of parental choice matters with respect to children’s educational
programs. When parents push for a more integrated program and the schools resist, it is unlikely
that the parents are the ones in the grip of standard operating procedure. Conversely, when the
school system proposes a more integrated setting and the parents resist, the parents may be
harboring outdated attitudes, but the integration may in fact be deficient for lack of skilled
personnel and quality services, curricular or disciplinary policy modifications, and protections
against harassment. A classic work of procedural jurisprudence contends that what should
determine the presumption for court cases should be which side is more probably correct in the
run of litigated disputes (Cleary, 1959, p. 13). When parents fight for inclusion and schools
resist, it is more likely than not that the schools are protecting their own interests, not those of the
students.

A compromise solution to some of the questions about the educational effectiveness of
integrated schooling might be found by attention to the temporary nature of many educational
arrangements. There are two temporal dimensions that matter. First, separate schooling may be
justified for part of the school day or for periods before the beginning or after the end of the
school day. Individual tutoring in a resource room setting for a class period is an example.
Individual activity for a small fraction of the day does not undermine a general program of
mainstream education. Some opponents of a presumption in favor of inclusion do not recognize
this option. Colker, in particular, challenges inclusive approaches on the grounds that resource
room services may be helpful for children with some disabling characteristics, when in fact the
judicious use of resource room activities may be part of an otherwise highly inclusive program,
as the Oberti court recognized.
In addition, temporal solutions may include full-day programs that are very intense and
do not include interaction with children without disabilities for some period of time, if they are
directed towards a dramatic improvement in the child’s opportunities to participate in integrated
education at an identifiable point in the near future. An example is autism treatment for
preschool children, which may entail one-on-one behavioral training programs occupying most
of the child’s waking hours, with the goal of enabling the child to be integrated into general
education kindergarten or first-grade programs with minimal supportive services. If this scenario
is realistic for a particular child, the short-term separate schooling will promote long-term
inclusion. The preferable option, however, is that endorsed by the L.B. court, which relates to
the temporal dimension discussed in the previous paragraph: intensive, separate programs at
home but integration in class during the school day.
Summary
Inclusive education in the United States and elsewhere is under challenge. The
experience in the United States with legal efforts to compel schools to provide integration
reflects an ambivalence that is present in similar enterprises elsewhere in the world. There is
good reason for the ambivalence. The integration ideal remains central to the achievement of
disability rights, but concerns over subordination and cultural identity also remain. Even the
educational effectiveness of integrated schooling can sometimes be questioned. Nevertheless,
the problem is not with the ideal of inclusive education, but with how it has been actualized.
Support services, modifications of rules, and effective action against harassment are needed to
make integrated education work. Efforts to obtain provision of services, modification of school
rules, and prevention of harassment are central to achieving inclusion and meeting its challenges.
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